openssl: add fixes for CVE-2009-1387 and CVE-2009-2409 (thx, puchu)
authornbd <nbd@3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73>
Thu, 28 Jan 2010 19:27:57 +0000 (19:27 +0000)
committernbd <nbd@3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73>
Thu, 28 Jan 2010 19:27:57 +0000 (19:27 +0000)
git-svn-id: svn://svn.openwrt.org/openwrt/trunk@19369 3c298f89-4303-0410-b956-a3cf2f4a3e73

package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-1387.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-2409.patch [new file with mode: 0644]

diff --git a/package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-1387.patch b/package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-1387.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..7a2a47e
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/270305
+
+fix from upstream
+
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -585,30 +585,31 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
+                       }
+               }
+-      frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
+-      if ( frag == NULL)
+-              goto err;
++      if (frag_len)
++      {
++              frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
++              if ( frag == NULL)
++                      goto err;
+-      memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
++              memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+-      if (frag_len)
+-              {
+-              /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
++              /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read) */
+               i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+                       frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
+               if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+                       goto err;
+-              }
+-      pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
+-      pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
++              pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
++              pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
+-      item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
+-      pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
+-      if ( item == NULL)
+-              goto err;
++              item = pitem_new(seq64, frag);
++              pq_64bit_free(&seq64);
++              if ( item == NULL)
++                      goto err;
++
++              pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++      }
+-      pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+       return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+ err:
diff --git a/package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-2409.patch b/package/openssl/patches/900-CVE-2009-2409.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..4800968
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+http://bugs.gentoo.org/280591
+
+fix from upstream
+
+http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=18260
+
+--- a/crypto/evp/c_alld.c
++++ b/crypto/evp/c_alld.c
+@@ -64,9 +64,6 @@
+ void OpenSSL_add_all_digests(void)
+       {
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+-      EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2());
+-#endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4
+       EVP_add_digest(EVP_md4());
+ #endif
+--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+@@ -986,7 +986,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CT
+       while (n >= 0)
+               {
+               ctx->error_depth=n;
+-              if (!xs->valid)
++
++              /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates. It
++               * doesn't add any security and just wastes time.
++               */
++              if (!xs->valid && xs != xi)
+                       {
+                       if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
+                               {
+@@ -996,13 +1000,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CT
+                               if (!ok) goto end;
+                               }
+                       else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+-                              /* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,
+-                               * this is a waste of time.  That check should
+-                               * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
+-                               * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
+-                               * we don't verify again and again in SSL
+-                               * handshakes and the like once the cert has
+-                               * been declared trusted. */
+                               {
+                               ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+                               ctx->current_cert=xs;
+--- a/ssl/ssl_algs.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_algs.c
+@@ -92,9 +92,6 @@ int SSL_library_init(void)
+       EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
+ #endif
+-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+-      EVP_add_digest(EVP_md2());
+-#endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+       EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
+       EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl2-md5");
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